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A PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO THE MEANING OF SCIENCE 
James Slack 
Department of Biology 
Viterbo College 
La O-osse, WI 54601 
It would seem to be a rat her simple matter to defin e what science is and 
how it operates. After all , a good portion of ou r high school and coll ege 
ca ree rs have been spent in science classrooms and laboratories. Possible 
answers might be that sc ience is an orga nized body of knowledge and that it 
operates by discove ri ng the t ruth abo ut nat ure through the use of sc ientifi c 
method. It seems equally sim ple to visuali ze science as a ma ssive pile of bricks 
with each scientist adding a new brick each time he discovers a new fact or 
invents a new theo ry. Further , if one has eve r taken the time to read the 
history of a discipline in a textbook. the picture portrayed is one of a steady 
prog ression in a logica l and straigh tforward manner from ignorance to 
present-day truth . Probab ly mos t of us view sc ience in such a way. 
This paper will attempt to give a different view of what science is and how 
it operntes. This other view o f sc ience is based on the premise that without 
inst rumentat ion , man is li mited in what he can "know" because he is limited 
in what his senses perce ive, (Only certa in phenomena are detected by ma n's 
sensory receptors) For example, onl y a small portion of elec tromagneti c 
rad iation (visible light) is detec table by man 's eyes . In addition, there are 
phenomena that man does not perce ive at all , such as magnet ic pull , gravity 
and atomic radiation. There ma y be, and mos t likely are, other phenomena 
that exist in nat ure of which we are completely unaware. These unknown 
phenomena may be as important or more imp ortant in determining and 
shapin g our ex istence . Because man is limi ted in what his senses perceive, he 
will probably never know ultimate reality (the way nature really is). 
What then does science study? Science stud ies those judgments 
(in fere nces) about our sense perceptions upon which uni ve rsa l ag reement can 
be at tain ed . In prac tice , scientists do not use this idea li zed proce dure for 
determining what science wi ll study. Scientists use another screening 
techniqu e, that is, they use laws. Laws are in variab le associations between 
two objects or events (for exa mpl e; gases expand when heated). Regardless of 
which screening technique is used, th e sa me objects or events are admitted 
into sc ience for study. 
What is Science? 
The definiti on of science (or what sc ience is) is different from what the 
subj ec t matter of science is. Science can be divided into two leve ls, an 
empirical leve l and a theoretical level. The empirical level deals only with 
"observables" (for exa mple ; rabbits, stars, bacteria). The activities of the 
empirical leve l include observation , class ification , data . collection and 
experimentation. Such act ivities culminate in the discovery of laws. Laws 
se rve as both a start in g point of science (subject matter) and as a final 
product of science. 
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The theo reti ca l leve l of science dea ls with non-obse rvables (for example; 
atoms, orbits of planets). The act ivities include the invention of theo ri es and 
the empirical verification of predictions made from theories . Campbell ( l) 
defines a theory as a system of ge neral and abstract statements capable of: (i) 
"explaining" , (ii) summarizin g a body of ex isting laws , and (iii ) forming 
new laws. The part of science that remains and continues to be expanded 
upon are it s laws. Sin ce man is limited in what his senses perceive, the 
theo ries that he invent s to explain phenomena may not represent ultimate 
reality . Theo ri es are the part of science that change; that is , theories are 
continually being revised -
With a better understanding of what laws and theories are, we ca n now 
find out more about science and how it operates . 
Thomas S. Kuhn (2), a philosopher of sc ience, believes that th e pattern of 
a mature sc ience is one of success ive transit ion from one paradigm to another 
via revolutions. A paradigm is defined as any achievement that : (i) gu ides the 
resea rch of a discipline; and (ii) attracts an enduring group of scientists away 
from competing modes of sc ientifi c thought. Theories can be paradigms as 
well as anything else, if they sa tisfy the above two criteria. 
The period during which one paradigm is replaced by another is ca ll ed a 
revolutionary period. A revolutionary period in sc ience is somewhat 
analogous to a political revolution. " Political revolutions are inaugurated by a 
growing sense, often restricted to a segment of the politi ca l community , that 
existing institutions have adequate ly ceased to meet the problems posed by 
an environment that they in part created" (2 , p. 92). This is also true of 
scientific revolutions. Scientific revolutions are inaugurat ed by a growing 
awareness that the ex istin g paradigm is no longer adequately ex plaining newly 
discovered phenomena. Today, most of us are not aware of past scientific 
revolutions because the problems and solutions of early scientists are viewed 
from the paradigms of today. However, they were periods of great turmoil. A 
classic example was the overthrow of the paradigm that viewed the earth as 
the center o f the universe . This revolutionary period was not confined to the 
scientific communit y but affected many facets of society. 
Conclusion 
The normal pattern of science then is for th e o ld paradigm (theory) to be 
replaced in whol e or in part by a new and incompatible paradigm. The new 
paradigm causes a re-evaluation of prior face and a shift in the problems 
available for in vest igation . 
With this introduction , we can now trace the history of a di sciplin e (for 
examp le; mi crobiology) from a more philosophica l point of view. In doi ng so , 
the hi story ofa discipline becomes more dynamic. 
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